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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the distribution of the values of patent rights in the
United Kingdom, France, and Germany during the post-1950 period. These values
are inferred from the behavior of patentees with respect to payment of renewal
fees on their patents. A simple economic model of renewal decisions is
combined with data on the proportion of patents renewed at alternative ages and
the renewal fee schedules to produce estimates of the distribution (and the
total) value of patent rights in these countries. Moreover, the data indicate
that there have been changes in the value distribution, and we follow these
changes over the period. The empirical results of particular interest
concern: the total value of patent rights and the relationship between
changes in it and changes in the quantity of patents, the skew in the
distribution of patent values, and the rate of obsolescence on the returns to
patents.
Mark Schankerman Ariel Pakes
National Bureau of National Bureau of
Economic Research Economic Research
269 Mercer Street 1050 Massachusetts Avenue
8th Floor - Cambridge,MA 02138
New York, NY 10003The objective of this paper is to analyze empirically the private
value of patent rights in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany during
the post—1950 period. Since patent rights are seldom marketed, we cannot
obtain direct evidence on their values. Instead, we infer the value of
patent rights from the economic behavior of patentees. In particular,
in most countries (including the three studied here) agents must pay an
annual renewal fee in order to keep their patents in force. We use a
simple economic model of the renewal decision to recover the distribution
of the values of the patents in a cohort from the proportion of patents
in that cohort renewed at different ages, and the renewal fee schedules
faced by the cohort.
The model, together with the renewal data, suffice to provide
estimates of the total value of the patents in a cohort, and its
distribution among the members of that cohort. In addition, the data
indicatethat the parameters of the model differ by both year and cohort.
Weallowfor these differences and then examine the implied movements
inthe mean and total value of cohorts of patents during the post—1950
period. Since there is little previous large sample evidence on changes
in the value of patents over time, mostaggregate intertemporal (and
cross section) comparisons of patent output have focused on changes in
quantitiesof patents (either applied for or granted; see, for example,
the articles in Griliches ed., 1984). Our empirical results indicate
that, at least during the post—1950 period in these three countries,
changes in the quantity of patents are frequently inversely related to
changes in the "quality" (or mean value) of these patents. Previous
studieswhichrely exclusively on the quantity of patents as an indicator
1of inventive activity miss the changes over time in the total value of
patent rights, and as a result their conclusions may be misleading.
Section 1 presents the patent renewal model, which is a slightly
extended version of a model developed by us in earlier work (Pakes and
Schankerman 1984a; Schankerman and Pakes 1985). Section 2 describes
in some detail the data set used for the empirical work. This new data
set consists of patent renewal rates and fees for cohorts of patents at
the aggregate level. It contains almost all patents taken out in the
United Kingdom, France and Germany during the post—1950 period. Section
3 describes the empirical specification of the model and presents the
estimates. In Section 4 we consider the implications of these estimates.
This includes an empirical characterization of the distribution of the
private value of patent rights for each country, and an examination of
the movements over time in both the quality and quantity of annual
patent applications. Brief concluding remarks close the paper.
1. A Model of Patent Renewal
Consider an agent who holds a patent. Let j denote the cohort of
the patent. and tbeits age, so t+ jrepresents the year. In order to
keepthe patent in force the agent must pay an annual renewal fee. The
renewal fee varies with the age and possibly the cohort of the patent,
and we denote the sequence of renewal fees at different ages by {C}.
An agent who pays the renewal fee earns the implicitreturn to patent
protectionduring the coining year, Ri. We shall assume that the
sequence {R.}is knownwith certainty at the time the patent is applied
for.'The agent's decision problem is to maximize the discounted value
2of net returns accruing to the patent by choosing an optimal age at
which to stop paying the renewal fee. Formally, the agent chooses the






wherei is the discount rate and T is the statutory limit to patent
protection. Provided the sequence {R —C.)1is nonincreasing in t,
the optm:l lifespan T is the first age at which —C
<0,or if
no such T £[1,2,...,T) exists, then T =T.Equivalently, in a world
of certainty with nonincreasing net returns, the condition for renewal
of the patent at age t is that the annual returns at least cover the
cost of renewal, or
(2) >
Since the renewal fees are nondecreasing in age (see Section 2), a
condition which insures that net revenues are nonincreasing is that the
sequence {R.} is noriincreasing, that is, that the returns to holding a
patent do in fact decay over time.
The sequence of returns {R} reflects the initial returns R0. and
the sequence of the rates of decay of those returns {6). If the
sequence of returns {R} were the swe for all patents in a given
cohort, then all patents would be cancelledat the same age and the time
path of renewals would be degenerate. We allow patents in a given
cohort to differ in their initial returns but assume that the sequence
of decay rates does not differ among patents.2 The decay rates,
however,will be allowed to vary inresponse to changes in the economic
3t
environment (see Section 3). Under these assumptions, R .= R .IId
T=l TJ
where di =1 and the patent holder will renew at age t if and
only if R0. > Ct.EdTL Let f(R0.;e.) and F(R0.;e) be the density and
associated distribution functions of initial revenues, where 0. denotes
J
a vector of parameters. Then the proportion of patents in cohort j




where z .= C II d tJ tJ TJ
The estimation problem is to use data on the proportion of patents
renewed and the costs of renewal to estimate the sequence of decay rates
and the parameters characterizing the density function of initial
revenues. These parameters will allow us to derive the distribution of
the value of patent rights and characterize changes that have occurred
in it over time (see Section 4). We begin with a description of the
data.
2. Description of the Data
The data were obtained directly from the patent offices in the
U.K., France and Germany.3 For each country we obtained information on
the number of patents in each cohort which were renewed at different
ages, the total number of patent applications in the cohort, and the
renewal cost schedules in nominal terms during the post—1950 period.
4There was no available information either on individual patents or on a
breakdown of cohorts by industrial sector or type of patent. Table 1
summarizessomebasic characteristics of the data.
In each of these countries, maintenance of patent protection
requires payment of an annual renewal fee which begins some years after
the patent is applied for and continues until the statutory limit to
patent protection. The range of patent ages varies across countries
(see row 1 in Table 1) and represents the span of ages over which data
onpatentrenewals and fees are available. The data contain (at least
partial) information on the renewals of between twenty—seven and twenty—
nine cohorts of patents applied for between 1950 and 1979, depending on
the country. The range of years in which we observe the renewals of the
cohorts still in force is 1955—1981 in the U.K. and Germany, but only
1970—1981for France.
The renewal fee schedules are published by the respective patent
officesand are changed periodically, but the most recent schedule
appliesto all patents regardless of the year of initial patent
application.Hence the renewal fee at a particular age depends on the
year in whichthepatent reaches that age. Thenominal renewal fees in
domesticcurrency were converted to real costs using the country's
implicitGDP deflator and then to 1980 U.S. dollarsusingthe official
exchange rates in 1980.
We designate a cohort of patentsas all those patents applied for
inagiven year, and distinguish different cohorts within a country by
theindex j. In the U.K. and France, the proportion of patents in
cohort j which is renewed at age t, is calculated as the ratio of
5Table 1.Characteristics of the Data
United KingdomFrance Germany
1.Patent agesa 5—16 2—20 3—18
2.Range of Cohorts 1950—19761951—19791952—1978
3.Range of Years 1955—1981 1970—1981 1955—1981
4.Number of Observations 258 209 312
5.Mean Number of PatentsperCohort 37,286 36,865 21,273




7.Ratio of Between Age to
Total Variance in P .tJ
.984 .999 .987
8.Ratio of Between Age to
Total Variance in C .tJ
.864 .976 .993
9.Ratio of Between Age to




a1 1976 in Germany and in 1980 in the U.K. changes in the patent laws
extended the statutory limit to patent lives to twenty years.
bThjs ratio is computed directly from the German data, and averaged over
cohorts. The data for the U.K. aridFrancedo not associate grants with
T4
cohorts. We approximate the ratio as T1 '[ .25Nt+T]/Nt where Nt is
t1 T1
the number of patents granted and Nt is the number of applications in
year t.
CThe ratio of the between age to total variance inX. is the ratio of
the variance in X —X to the variance in X. —X,after correcting
both terms for their degrees of freedom. Here is the average
(across cohorts) value of X. at age t, and X is the grand mean of X.
6renewals to patent applications (actually "completed specifications" in
the U.K., which denotes completed applications). Therefore, some of the
patent dropouts in the early ages may be "involuntary," reflecting their
failure to be granted rather than the patentee's comparison of returns
to costs of renewal. This is particularly true for France where patents
are recorded from age' two. In the U.K. the first observed renewal age
is five and we were informed by patent office personnel that virtually
all grants occur within five years after the patent application. In
Germany the renewal data are recorded only for patents which have already
been granted, but the age of the patent is based on the application date
as in the U.K. and France. We compute the renewal proportion as the
ratio of renewals at age ttothe patents from cohort jwhichare
eventually granted. The German renewal data avoid the problem of
"involuntary attrition," but they sampleonlyfrom the population of
patents granted (in contrast to the U.K. and France, where the population
consists of all patents applied for). The countries also differ
substantially in the fraction of patent applications which is granted.
The German data allow us to compute this fraction directly, but in the
U.K. and France we have to approximate it (see notes to Table 1) because
the data on grants are not identified with specific cohorts of patents.
As row 6 in Table 1 shows, the patent screening process in the U.K. and
France does not weed out many patents (83 and 93 percent of applications
are granted, respectively). However, only about one—third of all
applications are granted in Germany.
Thereare two dimensions to the data, the age and the cohort (date
of application) of the patent. The last three rows in Table 1present
7the ratio of the between age to total variance in the cost of renewal
the renewal proportion and the proportion of dropouts (mortality
rate) P —P..Itis clear that almost all of the variance in
t—l,J tJ
renewals and costs of renewals is between age variance, implying that the
age paths of the renewal proportion and renewal fees do not vary much
among cohorts in a given country. For the renewal proportion, however,
this is largely a result of looking at the levels (and hence the
accumulation of dropouts over ages). The total variance in the mortality
rate is divided about equally between the age and cohort dimensions.
Figure1 provides the average mortality rates at each age for each
country (averaged over the available observations on cohorts for that
age). The mortality rates vary substantiallyboth over ages and across
countries. This is particularly noticeable for the first few ages in
France, where part of the inter—age variance may be a result of the
patentgranting procedure. Figures 2 and 3 present the age paths of the
renewal fees and the proportion of patents renewed for each country,
averagedover the available observations on cohorts. Note that the
renewal fees rise monotonically and the renewal proportion declines
monotonically in age in all countries. The renewal fees start at low
levels and rise much more steeply in Germany after age six. The age
paths of renewals are strikingly similar in theU.K. and France after
agefive, and there is a large fraction which does not pay the fifth
renewal in both countries. More than half of the patents are cancelled
by age eight and only 25 percent survive past age thirteen. In Germany-
theproportion renewed is higher than in the other countries at all
ages, but it declines at a significantly faster pace after age six.
8*
Figure1. Age Paths of Mortality Rate of Renewals
*
20
The mortality rate at age two in Prance and age three in Germany
represents the cumulative dropouts until that age. The mortality












Figure3. Age Paths of Renewal Proportions
10
ranc
.7 14 lbThese characteristics are consistent both with our prior information on
the Germandataand with the model of renewal behavior in the previous
section.Since the German renewal data are based on granted patents, if
the German patent office is successful in weeding out relatively
unprofitable patents one would expect fewer dropouts in the German data
inthe early ages when the renewal fees in that country are still
relatively small and comparable to the renewal fees in the other
countries. After age six, however, the renewal fees in Germany increase
ata distinctly faster pace than in the ILK. and France. The model of
renewal behavior implies, all else equal, that this should result in a
faster rate of decline in the proportion of patents renewed in Germany,
andthisis in fact what we observe.
Twootherconclusions emerge from the evidence in Figures 2 and 3.
First,if the model of patent renewal in Section 1 is correct, the age
pathof renewals indicates that there is a concentration of patents with
very little private economic value. The reason isthat the model implies
that patents are renewed if the annual revenues exceed the renewal cost,
yetthe bulk of patents are cancelled even at rather modest levels of
renewal fees. Second, again conditional on our model, it may be
difficult with these data to estimate the tail of the distribution of
the valueof patentrights very precisely. Since renewal fees are never
verylargein absolute terms, a proportion of patents will be maintained
for the entire period, and the renewal data will not be very informative
on their values. (We return to this point below.)
113. Empirical Specification and Results
The model of patent renewal in Section 1 assumes a known, fixed
distribution of initial revenues which then decay over time. There are
several pieces of evidence which indicate that this may not be a good
assumption for the early ages. We reported in the previous section that
the mortality rate of renewals behaves quite irregularly during the first
few ages in France (see Figure 1). For the U.K. we do not observe any
renewals until age fives However, in Germany, where our data contain the
renewals of those patents already granted, the mortality rate at age
threeis much smaller than that for the subsequent ages, even though the
costs are essentially the same. Part of the reason underlying the
behaviorof the French data in the early ages is likely to be the
involuntary attrition resulting from patent applications which were not
granted——a phenomenon not accounted for by our model. A second cause of
the inappropriateness of the deterministic decay assumption in the early
ages is that in those ages future returns to the patent maybehighly
uncertain, and agents may hold the patent until more information on its
value accumulates. In a separate paper, Pakes (1984) constructs a more
complicated model of patent renewal which allows both for agents to
uncover more profitable uses for the ideas embodied in their patents,
and for the effects of the patent—granting process. Estimates of that
model indicated that these processes are important in the early ages,
but their combined effects are negligible in France and the U.K. after
agefour, and in Germany after age three. In view of this evidence and
thefact that the first observed renewal for the U.K. is for age five,
we base our empirical work on renewals after age five in France and the
12U.K., andonrenewals after age three in Germany. The universe of
patents is taken as those patents which survive to these initial ages,
and hence all renewal proportions P. are normalized by the value of
at the initial age for the associatedcohort.4
To complete the specification of the model one requires a
parameterization of the distribution of initial revenues, f(R0.;O)
where 0. is the vector of parameters for cohort j.Weexperimented
empirically with three alternative specifications, the Weibull, Pareto—
Levy and the lognormal distributions. The lognornial consistently fit
the data better than either the Weibull or thePareto—Levy.5 Assuming,
then, that R0 distributes lognormally and letting lower case letters
denote the logarithms of upper case ones, we have r0. —N(i.i.cY)where
N(,) designates the normal distribution. In logarithmic form, the
decision rule in Section 1 is to renew a patent at age t if and only if
ctj
rOjjjTindlj
Noting that (r0 — hasa standardized normal distribution, the
equation for the proportion of patents in cohort jwhichhave dropped









(5) y(1 -p•)= -+—c -
tJ tJ cio. tj o.
wherec(.) is the standardized normal distribution function.
Given only the proportion renewing in each cohort/age cell, we
cannot estimate separate decay rates for each cell and a separate
lognormal distribution for each cohort. However, we do want to allow for
some variation in both the decay rate and the initial distributions over
the approximately three decades covered by-our data. Given the lognormal
specification, the mean level of initial revenues in a cohort is given
+12
bye1 ,andthe coefficient of variation is o. We will allow for
cohort—specific values of ibutmaintain a common value of Gacross
cohorts. This is equivalent to letting cohorts of patents differ by a
proportionalrescaling of the initial revenues of all patents in a given
cohort. Second, we want to permit the decay rates to vary over time.
The initial revenues of a patent R0. will decay as the patent ages
because of competitive pressures, but they may also experience some
growth as the relevant market expands. The net decay rate will reflect
bothof these factors. To allow for this, we use the specification
dt.
(1 — = (1—S)exp{0g.+1D1+2D2} where is the rate of
growthof aggregatedemand (GDP) in year t +jandwe expect >
=1if 1960 <t + j<1969and zero elsewhere, and D21 if
t+ j>1970andzero otherwise. The time d.mmiy variablesand
are included to capture broad differences in decay rates across decades
which are not reflectedin annual movements in aggregate demand. Note
thatpositive values fororindicate a decline in the rate of
decayduring the 1960's or 1970's relative to the 1950's.
14Finally, in writing down the model in (5) we have ignored any
sampling error in the observations on The variance of the sampling
error is given by — where is the number of patents in
cohort j. For cohorts as large as those in the sample (see row 5 in
Table 1), this variance is essentially zero and will not affect the
results. In order to allow for discrepancies between the actual and
predicted values from the model, we follow Ameiniya(1981)by specifying
an error term in the renewal rule (4), c÷... Incorporating these various
specifications, the model we actually estimate is
- -
(6) =-+ -ln(1-- tj 00 tj 0 0
t tD+c
0Th0T12 tJ
where (conditional on t andi) is assumed to have mean zero and
variance Equation (6) is estimated by nonlinear least squares.
Table 2 presents the empirical results for various versions of
the model. Regression (1) in each panel refers to the model with a
constant decay rate and no cohort—specific variation in p (i.e., p. =p
for all j; we call this the no—effects model), while regression (2)
allows for a free sequence of (we call this the fixed—effects
model). The null hypothesis that there are no cohort effects =11
for all j)isrejected in all three countries. The computed F statistics
are F(26,203) =3.99fortheU.K., F(25,257) =12.10for Germany and
F(25,157)=3.95for France, compared to a critical value at the .05































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 the distribution of the value of patent rights in the post—1950 period
in all countries. A more detailed investigation of these changes is
provided in Section 4•7
Regression (3) in each panel presents the estimates for the model
which allows both for fixed effects in p and variations in the decay rate.
Note first that the basic parameters of the model (ii, o and 5) all have
the right sign and are statistically significant in all three countries.
The estimates ofindicate that the distribution of initial revenues
exhibits substantial dispersion and skewness in all three countries.
The degree of skewness is illustrated by the ratio of the mean to the
median value of initial revenues, which for the lognormal is given by
2/2 e (Johnson and Kotz 1970, Chapter 14). This ratio varies from 2.86
in Germany to 6.44 in France, indicating a rather sharp skewness to the
right. Intercountry differences in p are inversely correlated with those
in o, so that countries with higher mean returns have lower coefficients
of variation in those returns.8
The estimates of the rate of decay in the returns from holding
patents in the 1950's is lower in Germany (0.12) than in the U.K. (0.26);
there is no information on renewals in the 1950's for France (see Table
1). Together with the higher mean and lower coefficient of variation in
Germany, this seems to indicate that the relatively stringent German
patent granting procedures are, on the whole, successful in selecting
patents with higher initial returns and lower subsequent decay in those
returns. The estimated coefficients on the decadal dummy variables (
and provide some tentative evidence that the rate of decay declined
in the 1960's and 1970's. The implied estimate of the rate of decay in
17the 1970's is 0.17 for the U.K. and 0.11 for Germany, which is closer
to the estimate for France which is also for the 1970's. The hypothesis
we advanced that the rate of decay depends inversely on the rate of
growth of the market (> 0)receives mixed support from the data. The
point estimates of have the expected sign in the U.K. and France
though not in Germany, but the null hypothesis that 0 can be rejected
only for the U.K. Moreover, given the magnitudes of and the market
growth rates, the implied quantitative impact of GDP growth on the decay
rate is small, at least at the economy—wide level of aggregation. On
the whole, the estimates of the decay rate do indicate a fairly rapid
decline in the private returns from holding patents, higher than the rate
ofdecaygenerally assumed for the physical productivity of traditional
capitalgoods. This result is not surprising since the decay in the
returns earned from holding patents is not due to any decline in the
physical productivity of the knowledge embodied in them, but rather to
the two related points concerning the market valuation of the innovations
they represent——namely, that itisdifficult to establish and maintain
effectiveproprietary rights over the knowledge and that new inventions
are developed which displace the original one (see Arrow 1962; Pakes and
Schankerman 1964 summarize related evidence on the rate of obsolescence
in the returns to innovation).
4. The Value of Patent Rights
In this section we use the parameter estimates in Table 2 to
derivethe distribution of the value of patent rights and to examine
empirically changes that have occurred in both the size and quality of
18cohorts of patents since 1955. The present value of patent protection









where Rt —Cis the net revenue from holding the patent during age t,
I is the discount rate, 6 is the appropriate decay rate, and T is the
optimal lifespan of the patent as defined in Section 1
The lognorinal distribution on induces a distribution of these values.
The estimates of the parameters Ii, G,and6 are used to generate the
quantilesof the distribution of V and their standard errors by
simulating the value distribution.9
Table 3 presents the distribution of the value of patent rights
for the 1970 cohort in each country. The distributions for the U.K. and
France are based on the returns that accrue to patents which survive
until age five, measured fromage five until the patent is allowed to
lapse. Tvo sets are generated for Germany, one based on age three and
a second (for comparative purposes) rebased at age five. This is done
by treating patents which are cancelled (in the simulation procedure)
beforeage five as having zero value and adjusting downward the revenue
stream for all surviving patents by the factor (1 —6)2.
The most prominent feature of these distributions is their sharp
skewness. There is a dense concentration of patent rights with very
little economic value. -Themedianvalueof patent protection is only
$1861in the U.K., $897 in Prance, and $5710 in Germany. Despite a
substantial rise in the third quantile, only ten percent of all patent










































































aThe value of patent rights is the discounted sum of net returns from
age five until the patent lapses, for patents which survive until age
five, in 1980 U.S. dollars. The discount rate is 0.10 and the
parameter estimates from Table 2 are used for (li,a,5)——that is,
(6.36,1.57,.19) for the U.K., (7.51,1.47,.12) for Germany, and
(5.39,1.93,.l0) for France.
bEstimated standard errors are in parentheses.
20rights are worth more than $16,125 in the U.K., $13,682 in France and
$45,370 in Germany. Most of the value of the stock of patent rights
is concentrated in the tail of the distribution (especially the upper
five percent). The quantiles are estimated with reasonable precision
(standard errors less than half of point estimates), even in the tail.
The general picture of a sharply skewed distribution of the value of
patent rights emerges clearly in all three countries. We noted earlier
that the patent renewal data are the only direct source of information
on the distribution of the value of patent protection. However, the
limited amount of information available on the related distribution of
the value of patented innovations is similar in this respect. The
survey evidence in Sanders, Rossman and Harris (1958), and Grabowski
and Vernon (1983), and the larger—sample econometric evidence in Pakes
(1985) suggest that the distribution of values of patented innovations
is extremely skewed.
The mean of the discounted sum of returns from age five, among
those patents still in force at age five, is $6,963 in the U.K., $6,656
in France, and $19,124 in Germany. These differences are only partly
a result of intercountry differences in the proportion of patents that
survive until age five (a proportion determined in part by patent
granting procedures). The mean returns from age five among all patents
applied for (in contrast to just those surviving) are $4,735 in the
U.K., $4,792 in France, and $6,502 in Germany.10 Note that these latter
values are almost perfectly proportional to the levels of GDP in the
various countries ($435.2, $457.8, and $623.8 million in the U.K.,
France, and Germany, respectively). The evidence, therefore, is
21consistent with a form of Schmookler's (1966) demand inducement
hypothesis in which differences in the returns from holding patents are
primarily determined by differences in market size.
An estimate of the total discounted (at ten percent) value of
patent protection from age five for all those patents in the 1970 cohort
can be obtained by multiplying the means provided in the last paragraph
by the number of patents applied for in the 1970 cohort. These estimates
are: $234 million for the U.K., $217.6 million for France, and $381.7
million for Germany. As measures of the total value of patent protection,
these figures are biased downwards since they ignore both the value of
patent protection for those patents which do not survive until age five,
and the value of the first five years of protection for those patents
which do survive. Nevertheless, it would be of interest to compare them
to the R&D costs of producing the patents in the 1970 cohort. Though
the desired R&D figures are not available, we do have the R&D
expenditures made by the business enterprises in each country in 1970
(OECD 1982). The ratio of the value of the patent rights from age five
in these countries to the R&D expenditures of their business enterprises
is .057 in the U.K., .068 in France, and .056 in Germany. This
comparison of our estimates of the total value of patent rights in a
country to that country's R&D costs ignores, in addition to the value
of patent protection prior to age five, various balance of trade and
timing effects." Even so, the figures do suggest two conclusions.
First,the returns that result fromthe proprietary rights created by
thepatentlaws seem to be over 5.5 percent of total R&D expenditures.
Ofcourse, whether a six percent increase in the value of inventions
22represents a quantitatively important stimulus to R&D effort depends on
the response elasticity of R&D investment to such incentives——a topic
beyond the scope of this paper. The second conclusion is that the bulk
of the returns from R&D investments do not seem to result from the
ability of R&D performers to obtain patents. It is worth emphasizing,
however, that these are aggregate results and the relative importance of
patent protection may differ across sectors of the economy.'2
One further caveat is in order here. We noted that the results
indicate thatmuchof the total value of the patent rights in a cohort
ofpatentsis concentrated in the tail of the value distribution. Since
the patents in this tail are those which are renewed until the statutory
limit to patent lives, our only nonparametric information on their values
results from the behavioral assumption that they would not be renewed at
the statutory limit unless their current returns were greater than the
costs of renewal. Our model imputes exact values to these patents by
extrapolating the estimated lognormal distribution. As noted earlier,
the lognormal distribution did fit the observed renewal data better than
the other distributions we tried (see note 5), but we used a global
measure of fit which may not reflect closeness of fit in the tail. Of
course we can never compare fits for that part of the tail we do not
observe, but we can examine the robustness of our conclusions to
dropping the renewal information in the neighborhood of the expiration
date. This corresponds to asking what would have happened if we had
less information on the-tail than we did in fact have.'3 Dropping the
lastone, two, and three ages results in a change of the estimate of the
mean value of the U.K. distribution from $6,963, to $6,686, $7,296, and
23$9,176, respectively. The corresponding changes for the French means
are from $6,656, to $6,301, $6,401, and $6,696; and for Germany from
$19,124 to $17,363, $17,176, and $18,094. None of these differences
alters the qualitative nature of the conclusions drawn above.
Table 4 summarizes the secular changes that have occurred in the
characteristics of cohorts of patents between 1955 and 1975. It provides
index number values, at five year intervals, for the number of patents
rsl4AFr,'r(PtC thc niiin1-,- r.f -cyt-c 11,7,tr1r ,ir,141 f-i'.,o ('Pç\ \••/ \._'/
theestimates of the mean value of patent protection from age five for
patents that survive until age five (V), and the estimates of the total
value of patent protection from age five (V). This table makes it clear
that there are striking differences between the changes that occur over
time in the number of patents in a cohort, and those that occur in the
value of the patent rights embodied in those cohorts. Regardless of
whether PA or P5 is used as .a measure of quantity, we find that in all
countries (though to varying degrees) the number of patents increased
between 1955 and 1965, but then decreased between 1965 and 1975. In
contrast, the value of the cohorts of patents increased in both ten—year
intervals——and the increase was greatest in the later period in the U.K.
and Germany. The point to stress here is that our estimates imply that
one cannot make inferences on changes in the value of cohorts of patents
during this period from changes in the quantity of patents in those
cohorts, for there have been large (and largely offsetting) changes in
the "quality" (or mean values) of the patents in the cohorts. We return

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Before going into country specific detail, it should be noted both
that PA and P5 move in a similar fashion in all countries (so that either
could be used to follow changes in the quantity of patents) ,andthat
changes in V over time in each country are quite highly (and positively)
correlated with changes in GDP in the respective countries. The squared
correlation coefficient between changes in log V and those in log GDP
are .92, .55, and .91 for the U.K., Germany and France, respectively.
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holdingpatents depend primarily on differences in market size receives
some support in the time series (differences within a country over time),
as well as in the cross section (differences across countries), dimensions.
Our estimates imply that in the U.K. the total value of a cohort
of patents approximately doubled over the twenty year period (GDP
increased by a factor of 1.65 over the sametimespan). The increase in
the total value index resulted from about equal increases in the quantity
(PA or P5), and the quality (V), indices. A more detailed look at the
underlying data, however, reveals two distinct subperiods for each index.
Between 1955 and 1969 the quantity index moved up rapidly, while the
quality index actually declined somewhat. In 1969 there was a clear
structural break which reversed the direction of change of both indices.
The quantity of patents declined and their quality increased thereafter.
In Germany the total value of a cohort of patents also doubled over the
twenty—year period (GDP increased by a factor of 2.37), but almost the
entire increase resulted from increases in the quality index (the
quantity of patents in a cohort barely changed over the period). There
are also two distinct subperiods in the German data. From 1955 to 1964
26the quantity of patents increased slightly and there was a barely
perceptible drop in the quality index. After 1964 there was a sharp
increase in the quality index and a small decrease in quantity. In
France the total value of a cohort tripled over the twenty—year period
(GDP increased by a factor of 2.67), and this was a result of roughly
equal increases in the quality and quantity indices. There is also some
indication of two subperiods in the French results, though the break
between them seems to be much less sharpthanfor the UK.orGermany.
Both quantity and quality indices move upward fairly smoothly until 1966,
at which point the quantity index begins a slow downward trend and the
qualityindex moves upward more sharply (though in a somewhat choppy
fashion).
We conclude from this evidence that there appears to besome kind
of structural break in the mid to late 1960's in all three countries.
This shift is characterized by a marked decline in the number of patents
in a cohort and a simultaneous sharp increase in the mean value of the
patent rights of patents in a cohort in the U.K. and Germany (and
possibly in France). A number of authors have noted an apparent world-
wide decline in patenting activity during the 1970's (e.g., Evenson 1984;
Griliches 1984). Evenson (1984) also documents a pervasive decline in
patenting per unit of inventive input since the late 1960's (including
the U.K., France and Germany). He interprets this trend as evidence of
an exhaustion of technological potential, that is, as a decline in the
"real invention per unit of inventive input" (Evenson 1984, p. 108).
However, the evidence in this paper on the rise in the mean value of
patent rights since the late 1960's suggests an alternative, though not
27mutually exclusive, hypothesis. Part of the decline in patenting per
unit of inventive input may reflect a shift away from "more patentst' to
patentsof "higher quality."
Concluding Remarks
This paper provides an empirical investigation of the private
valueof patent protection and its changes over time. The approach is
based on a simple model of patent renewal behavior, originally developed
in Pakes and Schankerman (1984 ).Thepatent holder makes a decision
each year, until the statutory expiration, whether to renew the patent
on the basis of a comparison of the cost of renewal and the contemporaneous
revenues which accrue to holding the patent. Given an assumed
distribution function for initial revenues and observations on the actual
time path of patent renewals and fees, the model delivers empirical
estimates of the parameters of the distribution function of initial
revenues and the rate of decay of these revenues. These parameters can
then be used to generate the distribution of the value of patent rights.
The empirical application of the model is based on a lognormal distribution
of initial revenues and a comprehensive data set covering essentially all
patent applications made during the post—1950 period in the U.K., France
and Germany.
Thequalitative characteristics of the empirical results that
emerge from this study can be suuiniarized quite succinctly. First,the
distributionof the value of patent rights issharply skewed in all three
countries.There is a concentration of patent rights with very little
privateeconomic value, but the tail of the distribution contains highly
28valuable patent rights. Second, the private rate of decay in revenues
is quite high, and there is some evidence that it declined during the
1960's and 1970's. Third, the aggregate value of patent rights, though
large in absolute terms, appears to be less than ten percent of the
domestic R&D expenditures of the business enterprises in these countries.
Though this finding suggests that at the aggregate level patent
protection is a relatively small component of the incentive structure
underlying private R&D investments, it does not necessarily imply that
patent protection is an ineffective stimulus to R&D.
Finally, there have been substantial changes over time in both the
number of patents applied for annually, and in the mean value of the
patent rights that accrue to them. Moreover, the variation in the
quantity of patents in different cohorts tended to be negatively related
to the variation in their mean values, implying that exclusive reliance
on patent counts as an indicator of inventive output can be quite
misleading. In particular, there appears to have been a sharp structural
break during the midtolate 1960's, after which the number of patents
beganto fall but the "quality" of the patents that were applied for rose
substantially.. Our estimates indicate that once the movements in quality
are accounted for, the total value of patent rights increased rather
than declined.
The methodology and empirical results provided here suggest that,
at least in countries with renewal fees, it is both feasible and
important to incorporate explicit measures of the "quality" of patents
in measures of inventive output based on patent variables. The next
importantstepis to analyzethe empirical characteristics and the
29theoretical determinants of variation in the quality dimension at a
more disaggregated level, among different industries, and between
different types of patents.
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1. For a more complicated model which allows agents to be uncertain
about the {R} sequence see Pakes(1984).It should be noted, however,
that our model does not assume that the rate of decay in the sequence
{R.} is exogenous to the firm's decision making process. In a dynamic
context, a firmpossessingan innovation hastochoose between increasing
presentrevenues and inducing entry, and charging smaller royalties to
forestall entry. This choice isthebasis of Gaskins' (1971) dynamic
limitpricing analysis of situations involving temporary monopoly power.
Gaskins' model can be used to show that the optimal revenue stream
declines in age, a condition assumed below.
2. One interesting generalization of this model would be to allow
for differences in decay rates across patents and to estimate the
parameters of the joint distribution of the value of initial returns and
the decay rates. The assumption of a coon decay rate on the output of
inventive activity, however, is used frequently in the empirical
literature, and one advantage of our approach is that one can compare
the estimates provided in this paper to the values assumed in that
literature.
313. The raw data appear in the Annual Report of the Comptroller
General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks (United Kingdom), the Bulletin
Officiel de la Proprit Industrielle (France), and the Blatt ftir Patent,
Muster and Zeichenwesen (Germany). We are grateful for the assistance
of the respective patent office personnel for sending the data to us and
answering our subsequent queries.
4. The French data do not contain the renewal proportion at age
five for the cohorts 1951—1965, since they cover only the later ages.
To obtain estimates of P .forthese cohorts, we first ran a linear
5J
regression of P5 against the exogenous variables included in the model
(see equation (6) below) using the remaining cohorts 1966—1976. The
estimated parameters were then used to generate predictions of P5, P5,
for cohorts 1950—1965, using the actual values of the exogenous variables
for those cohorts. The normalization was then conducted with P ..Given
5J
the nonlinear form of the dependent variable in the final estimating
equation (see (6) below), this two—stage procedure is not fully
consistent but there is no alternative if we wish to exploit the French
data.
5. The comparison between the alter-native specifications was
based on two different measures of statistical fit suggested by Amemiya
(1981): the stml of squared differences between and where
is the estimate of implied by the estimates of the parameters of the
relevant model; and the weighted sumof squaresusing as a weight the
binomial sampling variance of about its true value —
whereN. is the number of patents on cohort j.Thecomparisons were
madeboth for the fixed effects and the no—effects model (see the
32discussion below). The logriormal specification fit the data best in all
three countries.
6. Two points should be noted. First, Ainemiya's (1981) suggestion
of superimposing the error E. which is presumed to be independently
distributed is not, strictly speaking, consistent with the model since
the sequence 1(1 —P)
is (by construction) nondecreasing in t. We
use Amemiya's procedure and ignore this problem in the results we present
because the estimate of the variance of E. is too small for one to
U
think correction for the problem would have a significant effect on the
parameter estimates. Second, note that since we have data only on the
cohorts rather than on individual patents, any patent—specific
disturbance (such as an optimization error in the renewal rule) is
subsumed in the distribution function.
7. Two remarks are in order. First, we tested a random effects
specification of the p's by comparing the within—cohort and between—
cohort parameter estimates for the model with a constant decay rate (see
Hausmanand Taylor, 1981). The hypothesis of random effects is rejected
decisively in all three countries. Second, we tried summarizing the
full set of cohort fixed effects asalinear or quadratic trend over
time, i.e., p=p+ a0j+
a1j2where prepresentsthe value for the
initial cohort. This specificationis rejected formally by the data
(computedF statistics about six), but the overall trends in the
individualp's are reflected by the estimates. In the U.K. and Germany
the quadratic fits much better than the linear trend. The point
estimates (standard errors) for the U.K. are p =6.47(.22), cx =—.048
(.013) and =.0022(.0005); for Germany, p =7.01(.13), c =—.0073
33(.011), cx1 =.0016(.0004). In both countries the implied 1i!s first
decline and then rise. In France one cannot reject the linear trend as
against the quadratic. The estimates are p =4.53(.22) and =.044
(.01).
8. The estimate of p for Germany is not directly comparable to
those for the U.K. and France since it is based on renewals from age
three. Naking the adjustment to age five (i.e.,+ ln(1 —)2)yields
an estimate of 7.04, which does not alter our conclusion. Note also
that we can estimate the response of patent renewals to the costs of
renewal. The estimate of i/o provides the response of y. =_1(1—
toincreases in costs. The estimates in the table imply that a one
percent increase in renewal fees decreases the proportion renewed by
about .02 percentage points. (This is based on derivatives evaluated
at sample means, but the figure does not vary much across ages or
countries.) Of course, to obtain the elasticity of P with respect to
costs we have to divide .02 by P, and this will vary with age.
9. We draw 50,000 pseudo—random variables from a lognormal
distribution with the estimated values of p and G,calculateV for each
of then, and then derive the quantiles of the implied distribution of V.
The process is repeated three more times, each time perturbing one of
the estimated parameters (p, o,and6) by one percent. This provides
numerical estimates of the derivatives of each of the quantiles with
respect to the parameters, which are used with the estimated covariance
matrix of the parameter estimates to calculate the (asymptotic) standard
errors of each of the quantiles.
3410. Thesemeans are measured by multiplying the mean value of
patentssurviving to age five by the proportion of all applications
which reach age five.
11.Not all of the returns to the patents in force in a given
country accrue to nationals of that country, and business enterprises in
a given country also earnreturns frompatents in force elsewhere.
Noreover, there is some lag between R&D expenditures and patentable
output (though the mean lag does not appear to be long; see Pakes and
Schankerman 1984). It is worth noting that the ratios presented in the
text are insensitive to the choice of cohort. The figures for the U.K.,
France and Germany in 1965 are .062, .087 and .067 respectively; for
1975 they are .085, .055 and .071.
12. In an important study of the British patent system based on
extensive survey data, Taylor and Silberston (1973) conclude that patent
protection is for the most part not an important component of the
incentive structure inducing R&D investment, but there are some notable
exceptions (e.g., chemicals and pharmaceuticals). Also see Mansfield,
Schwartz and Wagner (1981).
13. We are grateful to Robin Sickles for this suggestion.
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